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An unanswered question in information systems (IS) research is:  What triggers organizations to 
undertake reengineering or replacement of a mission-critical information system? While the 
benefits of reengineering efforts and new system implementations are well-documented, these 
large scale discontinuous system-changes are costly and known to be risky. IS projects 
frequently fail. A great deal of research has focused on understanding how new system 
implementations can be successful, once the decision to move forward is made.  Alternatively, 
this research examines the antecedents of undertaking that costly and risky discontinuous 
change, as well as the role of inertia that precipitates the undertaking. We conducted 37 semi-
structured interviews in three organizations. We explored the reasons for replacing or re-
engineering their mission-critical information systems. We employ three theoretical explanations 
of change as derived from the organization theory and strategy literatures to conduct a cross-case 
analysis. While in some case studies external environmental forces and internal strategy changes 
reveal themselves as antecedents, we found that across all three cases, inherent constraints in the 
system slowed and even stifled the adaptation and design of these systems. We draw on 
structural inertia organizational change theories to explain these antecedents and how the 
systems evolved into their current states.  
 




Increasingly, many organizations are frustrated by information systems designs that fail in 
meeting business demands. As a result, rather than trying to incrementally improve them, 
organizations sometimes choose to completely redesign or replace their information systems (IS) 
with the intention of gaining efficiencies, redesigning them to make their processes more 
efficient, or enhancing their business agility. Ultimately, organizations are looking to improve 
their organization’s performance, but what precipitates the need for such significant changes?  
 
While the benefits of reengineering efforts and new system implementations are well 
documented, these large scale or discontinuous system changes are also risky, given the 
frequency of IS project failures. As a result, a great deal of research on IS change has focused on 
understanding how new systems can be successfully implemented, once the decision is made to 
move forward with reengineering. Alternatively, our research examines the antecedents of 
discontinuous change:  how and why an organization reaches that point where they decide their 
systems have become a critical impediment to an organization’s performance--to the point that 
the organization chooses to reengineer or replace them. Like history, such failures are destined to 
be repeated if we do not learn from them.  Hence, the theoretical questions that this research asks 
are as follows: are the systems changes a response to external environmental forces, initiated by 
internal organizational motivations, or due to the systems themselves becoming maladaptive? 
Ultimately, what is influencing the need for a radical changes intended to bring about renewal?  
 
This research employs three theoretical perspectives on change in organizations. The sections 
that follow discusses these relevant organizational change theories, which inform the 
phenomenon found in the case studies to follow. Three case studies of incremental and radical 
change are presented using cross-case analysis. The analysis is developed by exploring the 
patterns of change that precede a significant discontinuous change. A discussion follows to 
explain the importance of this research and the implications it has for future work in this area.  
 
1.1. Theoretical Background  
Modern organizations increasingly benefit from and are subsequently reliant on information 
systems to support organizational functions. For those organizations whose products and services 
are now digitized (embedded in information systems), the design, delivery and support of these 
products and services is increasingly enabled and constrained by the design of the information 
system (Sebastian, Ross, Beath, et al., 2017). As the pace of change in today’s technical and 
business environments quickens, one criteria of success for an information system is its utility as 
a long-term sustainable resource for enacting and supporting products and services. This 
necessitates an organization having the ability to change (Lawrence, 2018). This includes the 
ability to alter the design of the systems as dictated by the needs of the business—i.e. enact 
changes to systems and related business processes. Specifically, changes are defined here as 
efforts undertaken for developing, delivering and supporting alterations to an organization’s 
products and services, which are embedded and supported by information technology.  
 
To inform this capability and increase the likelihood of success, this research examines an 
extended timeframe in which to study a system’s utility as an organizational resource. To do so, 
this research examines change from a retrospective historical perspective (Glick, Huber, Miller, 
et al., 1990), a method which has informed past studies of IS (Newman & Sabherwal, 1996) and 
contributed to IS and organizational theory of change and punctuated equilibrium (Sabherwal, 
Hirschheim, & Goles, 2001; Schilling, Beese, Haki, et al., 2017).  
 
IS researchers have employed punctuated equilibrium as a model of longitudinal and 
evolutionary change (Sabherwal et al., 2001). The focus of research in IS pertaining to 
punctuated equilibrium, however, has primarily examined events occurring during and after 
these punctuations, or discontinuities. Researchers have also discussed subsequent incremental 
changes that account for the system’s stabilization, which ultimately helps in refining the 
system’s design (Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). There is, however, a scarcity of research that 
examines theoretical explanations for events that led up to and influenced these discontinuities. 
Swanson and Dans (2000) offer one of the few empirical studies to develop an explanation for a 
system’s retirement. There are, however, theoretical works in the area structural inertia and 
punctuated equilibrium, which can inform these events.    
 
1.2. Explaining the Occurrence of Discontinuities 
Discontinuous changes in organizations are often explained by events, which fall into one of 
three categories (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). First, from an external-organizational 
perspective, adaptation is often undertaken as a response to changes in environmental factors—
e.g., technology, competition or regulation (Schumpeter, 1983). Hence, the faster the rates of 
change in the competitive environment, the greater the need to develop agile capabilities. 
Furthermore, in both turbulent and stable environments, sudden and significant changes in the 
competitive environment may necessitate large changes in strategy, structure and systems. This 
environmental shift can come as a shock to the organization’s capabilities (Christensen, 2013).  
 
Second, from an organizational choice perspective, an organization may determine that a change 
in strategy is needed. In doing so, the organization may choose to target new customers, develop 
new products or undertake geographic expansion (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Huff, Huff & 
Thomas, 1992). Thus, an organization may undertake changes intended to take advantage of 
opportunities in its competitive environment that could benefit from a new system or design. A 
third explanation for large scale change is that inertia, which forms in systems such as an 
organization’s processes and routines. Over time, inertia constrains an organization’s ability to 
adapt as it pursues its current strategy. That is, without a significant shift in the external 
environment or internal strategy, the organization finds itself unable to enact the changes 
required to continue along a normal evolutionary course given new business demands.  
 
The concept of structural inertia is central to understanding continuity and discontinuity in a 
systems evolution. Drawing on theories of structural inertia (Huff et al., 1992), small incremental 
changes are viewed as organizational adjustments intended to increase performance. Over time, 
these adjustments become less effective, however, as existing structures no longer yield the 
degree of improvement that is required (Huff et al., 1992; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984). Inertia is a stabilizing characteristic of a system. Over time, a system will 
move toward a high degree of stability. Inevitably, an inert system confronted with an increasing 
need for change has an increased probability of experiencing a radical change.  
 
A radical change in an organization can act as a means for renewal (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). 
Strategic renewal is the process whereby organizations can alter their path dependence by 
transforming their capabilities (Schmitt, Raisch, & Volberda, 2018). The discontinuity becomes 
necessary because the buildup of inertia has reduced their ability to execute incrementally. Such 
change reconciles the gap between a system’s structure and performance requirements (Huff et 
al., 1992; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). The change also facilitates the capacity for larger and 
more frequent changes (Amburgey, Kelly & Barnett, 1993) in the near future, prior to the new 
system’s stabilization.  
 
1.3. Conceptualizing Patterns of Change in Information Systems 
Inertia is conceptualized in this research as a systemic variable, which promotes greater 
performance, but also constrains the ability to change. As an IS system is implemented, the 
choices that are made during design and implementation determine the form of the system and 
the patterns of its basic activities. An organization with an inert system, confronting a changing 
environment or strategy, may undertake a discontinuous change to their information system in 
order to facilitate an increase in the capacity for larger and more frequent changes (Ross, Beath, 
& Goodhue, 1996). Tracing the patterns of evolution of a system, it is during initial 
implementation that the greatest opportunity is presented for adaptation of the new technology 
(Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). Then, as a system stabilizes, subsequent patterns of activity and 
choice of modifications decline. The incremental changes that do occur will tend to reinforce the 
current design through adaptation and reinforcement of its structure, informed by feedback 
(Gersick, 1991). Over time, the continual tweaking and fine-tuning of a system’s processes, 
procedures and technologies that support them will result in structures whose refinements 
increase performance and reward the current trajectory and organizational behaviors.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 are taken from two studies, one of incremental changes in a system after 
implementation, and the other from a study of structural inertia. The first is used by Tyre and 
Orlikowski (1994) to illustrate the decline in the number of changes over time. The second figure 
illustrates the declining ability of organizations to enact change due to constraints imposed by 
structural inertia (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Both Figures indicate that change increases 
following discontinuous, then slows over time, as a system stabilizes. Eventually, another 
discontinuity is expected to follow stabilization. The patterns of change these diagrams exhibit 




As each cycles repeats, the incremental and discontinuous changes result in varying levels of 
inertia. Thus, inertia is explained by the occurrences of incremental evolutionary changes 







Figure 2. Kelly & Amburgey (1991) 
 






Figure 4. Derived from Kelly & Amburgey (1991), this 
figure also illustrates declining change, due to structural 
inertia, which is elevated when discontinuities occur.  
 
 
Figure 3. Derived from Tyre & Orlikowski (1994), the 
figure illustrates a declining occurrence of adaptive change 










In the current research, we examine the ongoing occurrences of incremental changes that precede 
and ultimately precipitate the occurrence of a discontinuity. This is consistent with Tushman and 
Romanelli’s (1985) theoretical explanation of patterns of punctuated equilibrium and change. 
 
2. Research Methods 
This research investigates how systems evolve when change to them occurs over time.  The 
benefits brought about by the refinement of structures may negatively affect the ability of an 
organization to adapt. Three case studies in three different industries were analyzed to fully 
understand the phenomenon. Each case describes the occurrence of discontinuous changes, 
which occurred to mission-critical information systems. The central focus of the analysis, 
however, is the preceding events that instigated radical change. Thus, both the discontinuous 
changes that the organizations experienced and the events that preceded them are discussed.  
 
The cases describe the organization’s competitive strategy, their internal organizational 
management structure, the relevant products and services, and the role that information systems 
play in supporting their sales and service. These three organizations were selected because they 
are representative of the interplay of the three forces that influenced the need for discontinuous 
changes: (1) environmental shifts in competition, technological innovation or regulatory 
requirements, (2) internal shifts in strategy regarding product design, segmentation or geographic 
market, (3) evolution of inertia in structures and processes developed during previous 
incremental changes. Comparison of these issues allows for cross-case analysis of the factors 
affecting the organization’s perceptions about the need for a discontinuous change.  
 
2.1. Sample 
We chose industries that rely heavily on information as a critical component of their product or 
service, given that this would provide greater opportunities to observe recurring cycles of 
changes made to the systems. The insurance, financial services, and health care industries are 
characterized by dynamic technical, regulatory and competitive environments, which frequent 
require adaptations to product and process designs. They are also characterized by diverse sets of 
requirements for organizations that work across various geographic regions and specializations.  
 
Both the medical and insurance industries have undergone tremendous technological, regulatory 
and competitive changes in recent years, which have increased the frequency with which they 
need to reconsider the design of their product and service offerings. At the time of the study, 
each of these organizations was experiencing large-scale changes to their information systems.  
 
The first case was a large metropolitan hospital providing both in- and out- patient care at a large 
campus site with several satellite locations. During the period examined, the organization 
adopted a new system to facilitate insurance authorization and billing. The second case was a 
financial services company that sold products both in the United States and abroad. During the 
period examined, the property and casualty insurance branch of the organization was undertaking 
efforts to replace its automobile policy issuance and maintenance systems. The third case was an 
automobile insurance company that sold its products and services across most of the United 
States. During the period examined, the insurance company undertook several large-scale efforts 
to reengineer its processes for sales and service. The company replaced its billing system as part 
of an overall effort toward developing a new innovative product design.  
2.2. Data Collection 
To explore these complex issues, information was collected about the history of the information 
systems in each organization, including the historical events that influenced its current design, its 
beneficial capabilities, and limitations. The primary data collection was semi-structured 
interviews, which detailed the current change and the historical development of the systems. This 
method of retrospective event histories (Glick et al., 1990) offered the ability to gather the data 
that could inform both an understanding of the need for change and the forces that constrained it. 
 
Data collection included unstructured interviews (14 at the hospital, 13 at the financial services 
company and 10 at the insurance company). When possible, internal documentation and reports 
were acquired for analysis. Published articles and published teaching cases were also available 
for each organization. For two of the organizations, historical reports about IS development 
efforts, written by senior employees, were made available. Interviews included three groups of 
participants from each organization.  First, IS professionals (IS executives, managers, 
programmers, designers and testers).  Second, those representative of the business interests 
(actuaries, underwriters, product managers and those who managed the finance and operations), 
plus the chief and associate chief of staff at the hospital. Third, users of the system and their 
managers, including customer service personnel, business analysts and hospital clinicians.  
 
All interviews were conducted either on site at the organizations or by phone. Each interview 
lasted one to two hours. At the insurance company and the financial services organization, the 
interviews were recorded and then transcribed. At the hospital, notes were taken during in-person 
interviews and then a more detailed account was documented immediately afterwards. Follow-up 
interviews were used in several instances to confirm or expand on the evidence collected. Senior 
managers at each site then reviewed the initial case findings, either as a write-up or as a 
presentation by the researcher, to ensure the accuracy of events.  
 
The three cases afford cross-case analysis, allowing for comparison of events that the informants 
offered as explanation for the evolution of the organization’s information systems, the events 
they attributed to its current state, and the explanation for why its replacement was necessary. 
Holding with tradition in IS case study research, the alternative explanations are analyzed and 
evaluated through the process of deductive logic (Lee, 1989). This approach offers a scientific, if 
not quantitative approach, for comparative analysis.  
 
3. Data:  The Case Studies  
3.1. Metropolitan Teaching Hospital - Billing System 
At the metropolitan teaching hospital (MET-HOSP), the billing systems implemented just five 
years prior had allowed the organization to maximize revenue for both the hospital departments 
and the physicians. For example, departments were able to define their own fee schedules, 
allowing them a great deal of financial autonomy. They were then, through that autonomy and 
greater profitability, able to advance their individual areas of specialization by negotiating better 
salaries for their doctors. This enabled MET-HOSP to develop several advanced practices, 
including a level one trauma center and burn unit.  
 
During this time, the health care environment that defined physician reimbursements was fee-
for-service. The complex set of fee schedules used to charge insurance carriers worked well in 
this fee-for-service environment. However, with changes in the economics of health care and 
movement in the industry toward managed care and networks of preferred providers, the hospital 
struggled to keep pace with the growing demands for changes to rules regarding regulations and 
insurance provider payment schedules. Overall, the hospital found it increasingly difficult to 
keep pace with system changes. This problem was further exacerbated by the growing number of 
insurance carriers the hospital worked with, and thus increased the number of carrier-specific 
rules and contingencies that MET-HOSP needed to make to its billing systems. Ultimately, 
maintaining and updating the system became increasingly difficult. 
 
Ironically, the complex nature of MET-HOSP’s existing systems (originally set up to allow 
autonomy to the various specialization areas), made the design more complex.  Making changes 
across the organization became more daunting. A program manager reported that a six week 
backlog of changes demanded by insurance carriers was common place. As changes in the 
healthcare industry at large created financial strain, the hospital was adversely affected by the 
inability to keep pace with these changes. The delayed implementation of rules created 
reimbursement and cash flow problems. For example, until new rules were implemented, 
services were sometimes rendered and later found to be un-reimbursable by the patient’s 
insurance. Delays in changes to the billing system also delayed legitimate reimbursements.  
 
These financial pressures brought the limitations of the billing systems’ design into relief. The 
complexity of the fee schedules, combined with the approval rules designed and implemented 
over time, constrained the ability to implement necessary changes. MET-HOSP’s inability to 
implement change on a timely basis ultimately began to adversely affect performance. These 
constraints convinced MET-HOSP’s administrators that the billing system had to be replaced.  
 
3.2. Financial Services Company - Policy Issuance and Maintenance System 
The financial services company (FIN-SERV) competed nationally with property and casualty 
insurance products, in addition to health insurance. Life insurance, however was always the 
primary focus of the FIN-SERV’s captive sales agents. For the property and casualty lines, the 
mission was to support these agents with complimentary products, such as auto insurance. As a 
result, FIN-SERV had not aggressively priced or marketed its auto product and the auto product 
had a very conservative underwriting approach. The organization was also hesitant to offer new 
or innovative pricing and product features. Essentially, the product had changed very little in 30 
years. The property and casualty line’s management attributed this to the parent company’s 
indifference to the auto product line, since management considered it a loss leader.  
 
Furthermore, the product design and pricing decisions were made across three functional areas: 
underwriting, pricing and marketing. Decisions had to be negotiated across these departments; 
hence, changes to the product’s design were reportedly few and far between. For example, any 
changes to underwriting rules would affect the overall price of the policy and vice-versa, so 
underwriting and pricing had to be in agreement on any change. Because pricing changes can 
directly affect customer retention (often negatively), and because agents were not concerned with 
growing the auto product’s market share, marketing was seldom in favor of change.  
 
As a result, FIN-SERV had little interest in innovation.  There existed a severe lack of 
investment in new information technology and automation. For example, agents were still 
mailing in customer applications, which were entered manually by customer service 
representatives. Complacency with the status quo became the norm, as the old system became 
more and more difficult to change, stifling any ability to adapt to changing market conditions. 
Not surprisingly, performance declined and FIN-SERV’s demand for change in the auto product 
category was never great enough to bring about change.  
 
However, a change in management brought about a turnaround effort. FIN-SERV began 
expanding the number of distribution channels it served and moved quickly to develop a more 
competitive product. The obstacle the organization now faced was that the systems which 
supported the new distribution channels were very complicated and constrained by the state of 
the current systems. While product changes were infrequent, the aging technology had, over the 
years, experienced many incremental enhancements to improve efficiency wherever possible. 
This, combined with many variations in their work processes and procedures, resulted in a 
complex labyrinth of technology and manual work structures that were repeatedly described in 
interviews as ‘layered’, ‘difficult to maintain’ and ‘overly fragile’, making maintenance and 
enhancement projects slow, expensive and unpredictable. The aging and increasingly complex 
design of the processing system inhibited FIN-SERV’s ability to implement new products and 
services as quickly as desired. As a result, the ability to implement the new product design 
became the basis for replacing the entire policy system. In summary, in this case a new system is 
seen as a strategic necessity to introduce the new product and management’s new strategy.  
 
3.3. Auto Insurance Carrier - Billing System 
At the auto insurance carrier (AUTO-INS), the billing system, first implemented in 1985, was 
being replaced. AUTO-INS historically competed in the non-standard or high risk auto insurance 
market. This industry is highly competitive, since carriers compete primarily on price. Shifts in 
one carrier’s pricing strategy can leave competitors in unwanted positions--selling more policies 
than prudent in undesirable territories to high-risk customers. Further complicating matters, the 
industry is highly regulated at the state level, creating great variations in rules governing 
underwriting, pricing, and the collection and use of information. Companies also face a variety 
of competitive situations in different parts of the country. All these factors influence product 
billing design decisions, which, in turn, affect the billing system.  
 
Decisions at AUTO-INS were made by state product managers, who had complete control over 
the design and development of their product and pricing. AUTO-INS was known as an innovator 
in the way it segments customers and prices its policies. The product manager’s control over 
product design spawned a great deal of innovation and increased overall performance—e.g., 
growth and profitability. Billing designs were continually developed and refined for specific 
markets, in ways that were often honed to fit the state’s unique competitive or regulatory 
requirements. For instance, if the state mandated a specific driver discount, this would influence 
decisions regarding the billing calculations. Specific bill plans offered by competitors, especially 
those with large market shares, required AUTO-INS to offer bill plans identical to statewide 
competitors in order to provide accurate price comparisons to prospective customers. As a 
consequence, a great variety of bill plans were implemented across the organization. 
 
Over time, the systems had also been refined in other ways that helped to increase individual 
business unit performance. However, these variations in design across state products (embedded 
in the systems) created obstacles to change. For example, there were limits to the number of 
states which customer service representatives could proficiently learn to support. Furthermore, 
some billing changes and transactions could only be processed by certain senior customer service 
representatives, due to the complex and often idiosyncratic nature of their design. Nevertheless, 
as AUTO-INS remained very profitable, it continued to allow product managers to control the 
design of their bill plans, which further increased the complexity in the billing system.  
 
In the past, AUTO-INS had experimented at the state level with several innovative product 
designs and billing innovations, such as electronic funds transfer from agents, direct payment 
from customer bank accounts, and flexible billing dates that customers could select and change. 
Each of these proved to be competitively important, but the complexity of the system became an 
obstacle to their introducing these innovations across all of the states serviced by the company.  
 
The primary obstacle was the time and cost required to introduce a new product into each unit, 
given the heterogeneous and complex nature of the systems. Faced with an increasing number of 
requests for implementing new innovations and the pace of competitive change in the non-
standard insurance market, AUTO-INS had to find a way to stabilize operations of the billing 
system, while continuing to introduce new billing innovations.  
 
Ultimately, the system reached a level of complexity where, based on an internal analysis by the 
manager in charge, any general enhancement to the system would require in excess of 2000 
hours of work. At this point, AUTO-INS decided to embark on a multi-million dollar project to 
purchase and customize a new billing system in order to introduce a more standardized, yet 
flexible system, to hopefully facilitate a more efficient introduction of innovations. 
  
4. Analysis:  The Case Studies 
In all three cases, the organizations made a decision to replace the existing system, thus creating 
a discontinuity in its evolutionary trajectory. Despite the individual reasons that seemingly 
explain the need for discontinuous changes in each of the three organizations, the three forces at 
work (environmental change, shifts in internal strategy, and the cumulative effects of structural 
inertia) all present common threads in the three cases. In each case, subjects discussed 
competitive environmental considerations and internal organizational and strategic issues that 
affected the need for significant changes. Thus, despite the variant conditions and antecedents, 
inertia is a significant common thread in all three cases. Each case also highlighted the 
constraints to change imposed by the current state of the existing information system.  
 
MET-HOSP faced increasing external demands for change as it increased the number of billing 
partners it needed to accommodate, thereby increasing the number of changes required to process 
billing approvals and reimbursements. This can be explained by institutional influences imposed 
by the insurance companies and governmental health agencies that the hospital relied on for 
billing reimbursements. The technical nature of the changes demanded by these institutions is 
also the result of the increased proliferation of information technology as a means for instituting 
controls in organizations.  
 
Alternatively, FIN-SERV competed in a stable environment characterized by captive sales agents 
that had little interest in changing the design of the current products or the processing services 
supported by information technology. And, at AUTO-INS, the competitive nature of their non-
standard insurance market had long demanded constant changes in bill plans and innovations in 
information technology, which the company always supported. For these organizations, there 
was no sudden increase in institutional pressures or innovative shift in technology that explains 
the discontinuities in these organizations, although there is no denying that institutional and 
technological changes in these industries created competitive pressures over time.  
 
The discontinuity at FIN-SERV is most easily explained by the shifts in strategy that 
accompanied the arrival of new management. The poor performance of the property and casualty 
division was long ignored by the organization. New management brought about opportunities to 
address some key issues and try to turn the organization around. The new management wanted to 
inspire a sense of innovation and renewal, developing new products and change capabilities.  
 
It is more difficult to fully explain the discontinuity at MET-HOSP based on changes in the 
organization’s internal structure and competitive strategy. A new Chief of Staff did manage 
MET-HOSP through the implementation of the billing system, but the application suite was 
purchased before her arrival. Furthermore, the management at AUTO-INS had been in place for 
a very long time. At AUTO-INS, standardization was driving the redesign of underwriting 
processes, but the bill plans and payment options available to product managers were not part of 
this effort. If anything, the movements in underwriting meant that the product managers wished 
to retain their ability to experiment with bill plan and payment innovations, as a way to adapt to 
the local environment and competitors. In essence, managerial and environmental forces cannot 
fully explain the discontinuity at all three organizations.  
 
It is clear that AUTO-INS believed that continuing to adapt the current system was no longer an 
option. As the manager in charge of the system explained, it’s ‘because of what we did to it’. The 
organization allowed product managers to dictate the design of the bill plans and when and how 
certain innovations (like electronic fund transfer) were designed and implemented across the 
various business units. As a result, the system contained many variations. For example, there 
were 700 different bill plan options, where a bill plan defines the number of payments made over 
the life of the policy and the percent paid on the down payment. The organization arrived at this 
number of designs because managers adapted many different variations of these plans in order to 
match the offerings of different established and emerging competitors at the local and state level.  
 
While the change at MET-HOSP can presumably be explained by a significant shift in the 
external environment, this explanation does not hold as well for FIN-SERV or AUTO-INS. And 
while the discontinuity at FIN-SERV is best explained by internal changes (such as those to the 
management team, overall strategy and product design), MET-HOSP and AUTO-INS 
maintained a great deal of internal stability over the time period under study. Alternatively, the 
explanation for undertaking significant change at the AUTO-INS (structural inertia) was also 
resonant in the explanations offered at all three organizations.  
 
5. Discussion 
All three organizations implemented numerous incremental changes over the years, resulting in 
finely tuned, yet increasingly constrained designs. The resulting constraints in the systems 
prevented these organizations from responding to or proactively executing changes deemed 
necessary for maintaining or improving performance. Eventually, the organizations undertook 
very large scale, discontinuous changes to replace or redesign their systems. Thus, the constraints 
in the system were negatively related to the ease of future change. Therefore, increased levels of 
inertia decrease the ease with which future change can be carried out. Over time, adaptations to 
the design of the system and the processes surrounding its use will occur. The more significant, 
varied, and frequent these changes are, the larger and more complex the structures become and 
therefore the more difficult it is to undertake future changes.  
 
The occurrence of any single evolutionary iteration may or may not significantly influence a 
system. However, repeated over time, the relations between incremental evolutionary change and 
subsequent levels of inertia eventually come to influence future capabilities to adapt. Eventually, 
the need for change to accommodate internal or external forces may require a revolutionary 
change to alter the system’s structures in a way that will reduce the inertial state of the system 
and facilitate change, as these organizations indeed discovered.  
 
In the cases, while the organizations performed well, systems were incrementally improved and 
refined in a way that reinforced their current evolutionary trajectory. When the organizations 
wished to adopt changes by implementing new billing rules, pricing structures or technical 
innovations, the existing systems were found to complicate and slow the pace of change. 
Ultimately, the systems required radical alterations. These changes were necessitated in part by 
the declining ability of change afforded by these systems.  
 
These cases reflect the tension between the need for change (resulting from internal and external 
performance inadequacies) and the difficulty of change imposed by the information systems. The 
cases illustrate patterns of incremental evolutionary change in an information system. Over time, 
inertia slows the capacity for change so that a stabilizing effect takes place that eventually 
encourages a discontinuous change. This is consistent with the oscillating, but growing levels of 
change, inertia, and perceptions of change reported in prior theoretical and empirical studies.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper integrates multiple case studies and past research in the areas of inertia and change in 
order to support the need for more work in IS field in the area of change. This work enhances our 
ability to understand how changes affect systems over time and contributes to a better 
understanding of the processes involved. By employing theories of structural inertia, this 
research also explains how conflicting theories about adaptability and rigidity may be applicable 
at different times depending on the state of the organization and the nature of the current changes 
taking place. The reduced ability to change also demonstrates the long-term implications of 
structural inertia that may eventually lead to large-scale discontinuous change, thereby exhibiting 
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